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Th relief of world poverty has been an --=,,....,....,.._...Jr e official concern of nations for almost ~""-:7'.'--""" 
30 years. The Point Four Program launched by 
President Truman in 1949 focused attention on 
the use of external assistance to secure peace 
through the economic betterment of the so-called 
underdeveloped nations. The model for President 
Truman's program was the Marshall Plan, which 
had been spectacularly successfuJ in rehabilitating 
war-ravaged Europe. 
In 1949, there was confidence that similar 
advances could be made in other parts of the 
world through a transfer of capital resources. The 
twists and turns of international development 
assistance since then have been responses to the 
difficulties encountered in trying to foster the economic modernization of 
the world 's underdeveloped regions. 
The vision of 1949 could not encompass the rapid rate of decolonization 
and the explosion in the number of world countries, many of them far below 
the size needed for long-term economic viability. Nor did it demonstrate a 
realistic understanding of the magnicude of the resource transfer necessary to 
effect the process of economic transformation in the underdeveloped parts of 
the globe. What it did was focus world attention on the need to promote 
economic development and to recognjze the responsibility of those who held 
an economic abundance to share their wealth and knowledge with those who 
had little material substance. 
History of Assistance 
The first decade of development assistance concentrated mainly on the 
transfer of capital goods and on the building of public and industrial 
infrastructures. This type of assistance often required large investments of 
domestic resources in complementary forms before the benefits of the transfer 
were added to the annual income stream of the recipient nation. Often there 
was a long interval before the benefits of such assistance were realized; and in 
too many instances the promised returns were lost entirely because the 
complementary domestic capital was not forthcoming. 
By the late fifties, the end of the first decade of development aid 
programs, disappointment in the slow pace of economic change, despite the 
flow of international resources, caused many to reassess the basis of economic 
progress in poor nations and the role of development aid in attaining that 
progress. This reassessment resulted in changes in developmental activities. 
Assistance to bui ld human resources through the establishment of schools, 
direct help to the national budgets of recipient nations by the provision of 
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credits to purchase raw materials, the direct allotment of foreign currency 
drawing rights, and, from a few nations, shipments of food grains on 
concessional payment terms in local currencies were added to assistance for 
infrastructure and industrial capital formation. 
Also by the late fifties, help in science and technology and technology 
transfer was given a particular boost by the work of the international 
agricultural programs of the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. The 
contribution of Japanese scientists to this work is well known. The basic 
research in plant physiology that identified the importance of dwarf genes in 
enhancing the yields of wheat and rice was done in Japan. The transfer of 
biological materials to nations throughout the tropics from the Rockefeller 
program in Mexico and from the International Rice Research Institute in the 
Philippines called world attention to the importance of science and 
science-derived technologies in accelerating agricultural development and the 
modernization of traditional patterns of food production. 
By the late sixties, external assistance to national development programs 
was having a demonstrable impact on the economic progress of many nations. 
Close observers of the development scene were quick to point out, however, 
that despite two decades of effort, the absolute gap in economic product per 
capita between the richer and the poorer countries was widening, and that 
among the more advanced developing countries, the ability to earn the foreign 
exchange necessary to sustain their upward progress was being jeopardized by 
trade barriers and by price fluctuations in world raw commodity markets. The 
cry of "trade not aid" became a slogan with a biting edge. In one sense, it was a 
silly slogan; the poor countries needed both aid and trade. In another sense, 
however, it did call early attention to the weak bargaining position of the 
developing nations when they sought to negotiate reciprocal trade concessions 
or when they dealt with commodity buyers in international markets. 
In 1968, the development problem was reviewed by a Commission chaired 
by the late Rt Hon Lester B. Pearson of Canada. The Commission found that 
development progress was significantly below expectations and potential 
promise; that a significant factor in the shortfall was the volume of resources 
transferred from the richer to the poorer countries, especially the quantity of 
concessional finance for development projects; and that there were artificially 
imposed limits on the avenues open to the developing countries to earn part of 
the foreign exchange required to finance their development plans. On the basis 
of these findings, the industrial countries, working through their own 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), pledged that the official 
development aid from each nation would be increased to 0. 7 percent of their 
GNP by the latter half of the seventies. They also agreed to work toward the 
removal of barriers to trade in the products of Third W arid countries. 
Today, the recommendations of the Pearson Commission and the pledges 
arising from them still await full implementation. 
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Present Problems 
As recently as the late sixties, the economic development of most Third World nations 
was viewed hopefully. Although the Pearson 
Commission report had a theme of urgency and 
reflected disappointment in the seemingly meagre 
achievements of the past, it was basicaUy an 
optimistic document calling for a new dedication 
to the task of banishing poverty. 
But the authors of the report could not 
foresee the events of the early seventies. A 
potential for world inflation had been created by 
large U.S. expenditures for the Vietnam conflict 
and by unrealistic fixed exchange rates that 
undervalued the currencies of some of the world's 
most aggressive trading nations. This decade 
opened with a very large surplus of U.S. dollars in the hands of banking 
authorities outside the United States. All that was required to spark an upward 
spiral of prices fueled by this money was a major economic crisis or the fear of 
one. The international scramble for American grain in 1972 following a 
worldwide drought, and the decision by Saudi Arabia in 1973 to reverse its 
previous policy and to use its oil reserves as a political and economic counter in 
world affairs, combined to generate such a crisis; the relative world prices of 
two major international commodities rose to unprecedented levels. These price 
changes, in their turn, caused other prices to rise and necessitated major 
adjustments in the equilibrium of the economic system in virtually every 
nation. The process of bringing national economies into a new balance is still 
taking place and until it has run its course, the world economic structure will 
experience simultaneous inflation in some sectors and stagnation and 
instability in others. If resources, including labour, were truly mobile, the 
process of reestablishing an effective equilibrium would be hastened. But they 
are not mobile, and in nearly all countries, labour particularly has resisted the 
economic pressures for a reallocation of resources in an effort to preserve their 
real incomes. Of those nations with developed markets, Japan and West 
Germany seem to be undergoing the most orderly adjustment; Great Britain 
and Italy seem least able to cope. For a variety of reasons having to do with 
size, nationalistic temper, and geographic location, Canada has not been able 
to hold its earlier promise of economic flexibility. 
If the rise in the prices of food and oil hurt the industrial economies, it 
devastated the developing nations. OveraU trading deficits in the late sixties 
and early seventies between the low-income nations and the suppliers of 
industrial goods, food, and even raw materials were roughly $9 billion per year 
- an amount covered by official assistance transfers. Jn 1976, these deficits 
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were expected to reach about $40 billion. The imbalance was to be covered 
from many sources: from the IMF special fund for those nations most 
seriously affected by the oil price increases; from proceeds of the IMF sale of 
gold reserves; from nonofficial sources of private direct investment; from 
commercial bank borrowings; from noncommercial trade credits; as well as 
from official aid on both concessional and nonconcessional terms from both 
the industrial and OPEC nations. The result was a significant increase in Third 
World debt. 
From 1972 to 1976, the debt of developing countries grew from about $90 
billion to $250 billion. Commercial credit borrowings were roughly $20 billion, 
or 22 percent, in 1972, and close to $100 billion, or 40 percent, in 1976. The 
remainder of the debt is held by bilateral or multilateral agencies of donor 
governments. 
Although the bulk of the commercial credit has gone to a few nations 
such as Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Argentina, Taiwan, Peru, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia, countries not in any immediate danger of default, 
the long-term ability of these and other presently credit-worthy Third World 
countries to meet their external commercial obligations cannot be a matter of 
indifference to the industrial economies. If trading deficits of the present 
magnitude continue, and if they continue to be financed by resorting to 
commercial borrowing, the vulnerability of the world's capital sources will 
become truly a matter for deep concern. Limiting access to commercial credit 
in the absence of other measures to effect a transfer of purchasing power to the 
poorer nations will only cause world trade to stagnate further. 
For the less credit-worthy nations, the need for external finance to sustain 
some level of economic growth and for servicing past international debts is the 
most pressing problem. India's external debt load is over $14 billion, 
Bangladesh's $2.5 billion, and Zaire's more than $3.0 billion. In all three of 
these countries, and in most others, real growth in per capita GNP has been 
stagnant or has declined since 1973. Increased assistance from international 
sources is the only short-term solution to the economic problems of the poorest 
peoples. 
The salient points can be simply put. The developed countries cannot for 
long let their commercial banking system and private capital sources bear the 
costs of balancing trading deficits of developing countries without major trade 
relations. Without substantial increases in resource transfers, the economic 
progress of most non oil-producing developing nations will decline in the years 
ahead because they cannot continue to bear the trading deficits they have 
sustained for the past three years. 
Development at a Crossroads 
The accommodations that have been made through the IMF, the 
DAC, the fora of the United Nations, and even through the desultory 
dialogue in Paris between representatives of North and South, have not 
attacked the central point of a growing Third World poverty. The industrial 
nations have been slow to respond to what should be obvious. Concessional 
assistance in real terms, through bilateral and multilateral channels, 
has grown very slowly at a time when the need has rocketed upward. As 
a percentage of GNP, official development aid from DAC nations is only a 
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little closer to the 0. 7 percent target accepted six years ago than it was in 1973. 
In fact, for some countries the date for reaching the target is continually 
shifting. In the final analysis, the richer cannot escape their obligations to 
assist the poorer. The world is too volatile to accept with tranquility the 
prospect of growing wealth for one-quarter of mankind and stagnation for the 
remainder. 
Already the demands of the poor are being given a strident voice. The 
slogans of the new international economic order are in reality a plea for a 
better economic deal, the search for an assurance that the vast majority of the 
world's nations and peoples will be able to realize the development goals they 
have set for themselves. Although an economist can correctly point to the 
logical inconsistencies of the economic prescriptions of the slogans, the 
assurance cannot be denied on the simple grounds of economic logic. In 
practical terms the inelastic demand for most raw commodities supplied by 
developing nations means that prices fluctuate more than supplies, leaving 
exporting nations vulnerable to unpredictable and uncontrollable changes in 
earnings. The burdens of past debt now require service payments that threaten 
to equal the aggregate of official aid transfers. The barriers, both tariff and 
nontariff, that each rich country has erected to limit and control the flow of 
imports competitive with its own industry have a greater effect on the poorer 
nations who cannot offer attractive counterconcessions or be equally ruthless 
in retaliation. Thus, there is an insistent call for a reform of the world's 
economic system, a call that will persist and will grow shriller and more 
extreme unless the industrial powers respond in a way that provides genuine 
hope of economic advance to even the poorest nation. 
Surely it is not too much to ask that price stability be brought to world 
commodity markets; or that official debt burdens be eased through a general 
concession that would foster world economic growth; or that markets be 
opened to promote the wider economic efficiency of an improved division of 
labour; or that concessional assistance transfers be increased to assure the 
continued expansion of the economic strength of all nations. 
To accomplish most of this, it is not necessary to proliferate the 
international agencies and institutions concerned with development. With 
some alteration and adaptation, the existing framework of world agencies can 
accomplish these purposes, if the purposes sought are jointly pursued by men 
of good will and common aim who recognize the long-term coincidence in the 
interests of both rich and poor, and who are willing to accommodate the 
short-term needs of each. At the present time, the dialogue between the 
wealthy and the destitute reflects more confrontation than consultation, more 
rhetoric and debate than a joint quest, more an ultimatum than an 
understanding, more a hostility than a sympathy, more a grudging concession 
than a partnership. Such a dialogue cannot but exacerbate the aggressive 
contentiousness of the poor and the haughty arrogance of the rich. The real 
issue of how to ease poverty is in danger of becoming lost for the meagre 
satisfactions of political posturing. 
Development is at a crossroads. A crossroads implies an opportunity to 
carry forward in the direction one has come, or to change direction. I believe 
the industrial countries do have that opportunity, but the Third World does 
not. I hope we in the advanced nations will not stubbornly and blindly try to 
preserve an older course that now threatens to force those who have little to 
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fall further behind with no hope of catching up. I hope that we will change 
course and through our concerted action ensure that the task begun 30 years 
ago will not be unfinished because it demanded too much of us - even if more 
than 0.7 percent of our GNP. 
Whereas the question of augmenting the total resources available for 
development of the poorer nations is the most fundamental of the issues 
between the Third World and the industrialized countries, the search for ways 
to alleviate poverty is carried on at three levels. I have dwelt upon the first, that 
is, the total of external real resources available for developmental purposes. 
The second level centres on the quantum of resources that can be mobilized 
internally by each nation to finance its own development investments. The 
third level focuses on the investment activity itself, that is, the microproblems 
of project selection, formulation, and implementation. 
Mobilization of Resources 
It is often suggested that developing countries themselves are not 
aggressive enough in mobilizing their own internal resources to finance their 
development plans. In support of this, the failure to act wisely by one or 
another country is used to illustrate the generalization. But, the generalization 
does not hold in the aggregate. I know of no reliable estimate of how much 
low-income nations spend from their own resources to finance their 
developmental budgets. However, if we assume that the 75 countries listed by 
the World Bank as having per capita incomes of less than $500 are able to 
allocate as much as 15 percent of their gross national product for this purpose 
- a high figure for poor nations where the marginal propensity of most of 
their population to consume is probably above 0.95 - the total available 
would be less than $80 billion, a billion dollars per country per year. For 
almost two-thirds of mankind, then, there is virtually no capacity to generate 
an investment surplus commensurate with the economic needs and potentials 
of their nations. Perhaps it would be possible through appropriate incentives 
to push the savings rates in many countries to levels above the 15 percent cited. 
But even if the figures were doubled, the amount available would still be 
minuscule for the tasks of national modernization. There are, however, several 
instances where low-income nations appear to have succeeded in expanding 
their capital base despite their poverty. China has demonstrated that by the 
disciplined mobilization of a vast manpower it is possible to create an immense 
base of infrastructural capital. Large countries with large populations such as 
India, Pakistan, and Indonesia might be able to effect a similar transformation 
under suitable forms of social organization. It is unlikely, however, that this 
route is open to countries with small populations. 
At a more fundamental level of analysis, the process of economic 
modernization involves the transformation of the technological base of 
agrarian societies to one of applied science. Production derived from 
traditional folk wisdom and the use of muscle energy cannot be much larger 
than $200 per capita per year, not enough to yield the sizable surplus required 
to finance a rapid technological transformation. In this case, the operative 
word is "rapid." If Third World nations were prepared to stretch their 
development over many generations, the low savings rates they can sustain 
might permit the slow accumulation of the needed capital base. But the urgent 
aspirations of Third World peoples and the short-run inexorable pressure of 
8 
population increase leaves little time for the usual processes of capital 
accumulation to be effective. These are the facts that justify external 
development assistance. They are also the justification for examining more 
closely the philosophy of development held by most low-income nations, with 
China, Tanzania, Taiwan, South Korea, and more recently, Brazil, being 
notable exceptions. 
Enshrined in developmental theory and practice is a view that divides 
underdeveloped economies into "traditional" and "modern" sectors. The 
traditional is the agrarian and rural sector from which are expected to flow 
food, labour, and an investable surplus of resources to build the modern 
industrial and urban economy. Until industry can sustain from its own 
proceeds its requirements for capital growth, the rural sector must be exploited 
for its extractable surpluses. It is a corollary of this view that the rural sector 
should not expect to exercise a primary claim on the investable resources of the 
nation, for that would place it in competition with the priority growth of its 
modern counterpart. Likewise, an improvement in the living standards of rural 
peoples is made secondary to the well-being of the urban-industrial proletariat. 
The exploitation of the rural economy is accomplished in many ways. 
Governmental export-commodity marketing boards buy from local farmers at 
levels far below the world prices the boards receive from international sales; or 
export taxes are used to hold the return to the farmer low and treasury profits 
high; international food aid is sold directly to consumers and has the effect of 
depressing internal agricultural prices; government monopsony food markets 
hold farm product prices down and indirectly tax farmers to subsidize urban 
consumers; even taxes and tariffs on farm supplies are used to divert the flows 
of real income from farmers to other economic classes. 
Unfortunately, the exploitation of the rural economy is the basis for most 
development practice in Third World nations. Two results are evident: food 
shortages have been and are acute in most developing countries; and the rural 
poor have provided little investable surplus for building modern economies. It 
is clear from the record of the past three decades that the neglect of 
agricultural modernization and rural development has left a major 
high-income resource in most poor nations underdeveloped. The continued 
low level of productivity of the rural sectors, not surprisingly, has meant the 
continued exploitation of poverty as the internal basis for financing 
modernization. Taxing the poor by the poor is not a very satisfactory way of 
becoming rich. 
It seems clear that the neglect of rural development and agricultural 
productivity in low-income nations has contributed significantly to the slow 
pace of economic advance. Not only has the need to import food drained 
foreign exchange reserves and curtailed capital formation, but in many 
countries, low farm incomes have depressed domestic nonfarm economic 
activity. When the largest single group of national consumers does not have 
the purchasing power to demand urban sector goods, it is not surprising that 
total advance is slow. 
Indeed, if developing countries are to be criticized on their failure to 
mobilize local resources for development, the case can be best made on the 
basis of their neglect to encourage rural development and agricultural 
modernization, a modernization that can secure an assured source of food 
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while providing the majority of their peoples with the income needed to 
establish a domestic industrial market. 
The Responsibility of Developed Nations 
To an extent that I find discomfiting, the industrial nations must share a 
large portion of the blame for this neglect of rural development. For a variety 
of reasons - perhaps because we ourselves were confused about the true 
underlying developmental process, or the self-interest pursuit of plant and 
equipment sales, or restrictions on the free use of aid monies, or politically 
motivated loans and grants - we did not press rural development as a part of 
our assistance offerings until very recently, in most cases not until after the 
food crisis of 1972. We should have done so much earlier. A careful study of 
our own development experience would have provided the guidelines for such 
an insistence. In the future, we had best not forget the lessons of the past. 
It is fashionable in some circles to talk glibly of world poverty as a 
function of the inequitable international distribution of the present world 
economic product, and of the political and economic power inherent in this 
distribution. I find in this talk more poetry than hard analysis. Poverty cannot 
be overcome by its redistribution. In the sense of a Pareto optimal on an 
international scale, that is, a policy that would make some people better off 
without reducing the levels of well-being attained by others, we are still far 
short of having developed the underdeveloped parts of the world. Indeed, the 
key to development is the expansion of goods and services, the enhancement of 
productivity in Third World nations. Any other prescription is a cruel hoax. 
This is not to suggest that the distribution of income in any nation is not 
politically of equal importance to its generation. How the goods and services 
produced in a country are distributed, and to whom, is a question for national 
policy; the outsider risks his welcome if he comments. One of the most 
intractable problems of development research is to define clearly the 
interaction between the distribution of the claims on the national income 
stream, and the generation of growth in that stream. I have suggested in the 
case of agriculture, that the diversion of reward for economic effort from 
farmers to city dwellers has lowered productivity and the rate of innovation 
and modernization among cultivators. Similar disincentives to higher 
productivity can arise from a number of public interventions in the operation 
of the mechanisms of free economic allocation. Developing countries can yield 
their own examples of high-productivity opportunities forgone because the 
benefits of enterprise could not be captured by those best able to exercise 
entrepreneurship. But however painful these examples may be (and they can be 
matched or topped by stories from the developed nations), the examples and 
consequences of distributive injustice are often more poignant. 
It is easy to understand how the explicit realities of injustice can 
overwhelm the intangible shadows of possible income foregone when policies 
for economic advance are drawn. Unfortunately, the vise of poverty in the 
developing world gives little opportunity to bring effective redress to 
distributive inequities; such redress will be possible only with the 
encouragement of enterprise in a policy setting that carefully balances 
improvements in distribution with measures to accelerate the growth of 
output. As external aid agencies and developing-country governments have 
10 
become more sens1t1ve to the interlinked questions of distribution and 
production, attention has shifted from project activities focused on one or the 
other of these goals to those that strive to combine the two. Projects to 
improve the productivity of small farmers, or to increase employment among 
the urban poor, or to improve the productivity of a work force by the control 
of endemic diseases are instances among many that might be cited of attempts 
to combine a wider distribution of the benefits of development with the 
development activity itself. 
The hard reality of engineering development is encountered most 
forcefully in the process of identifying, preparing, and implementing projects 
that will leave a legacy of benefits in the form of added goods and services. The 
essence of development, and the ultimate test for development projects, must 
rest upon the appropriately discounted internal rates of return to the 
investments made - a rather cold calculation, but if it is ignored, the 
expenditure of scarce resources will have little long-term capacity to inhibit 
poverty. 
Every international assistance agency has its tragic-comic stories of 
project foolishness and waste. Often the causes can be traced to honest errors 
of judgment, or to faulty technical assessments of feasibility, or an 
overestimation of the performance capabilities of one or more of the partners, 
or, and this must be of greater concern, to project purposes that were not 
related to the expansion of national output in the recipient nation. Projects 
that have social or political goals are perfectly valid as agreed undertakings 
between donor and recipient governments. But let us be honest, at least among 
ourselves: these fall well outside the processes we seek to initiate and support 
when we claim to be engaged in activities designed to achieve the sustained 
improvement of the well-being of the world's poor peoples. 
A Working Example 
Of all the world's aid agencies, only the World Bank can point to a record 
of project development that has held most closely to the principles of 
investment for long-term economic returns. Although no Bank staff member 
would deny that they have their share of tragic-comic projects, Bank activities, 
at least in recent years, are a tribute to the successful pursuit of productive 
investments that are contributing in major measure to the permanent capacity 
of many countries to provide a better life for their citizens. 
Unfortunately, in the present environment of uncertainty ave;: 
development directions, the concept of economic viability as the basis for 
project development is under attack. Because the World Bank has established 
the standards of project analysis that others strive to emulate, the attack has 
focused primarily on Bank activities. On the one hand, the Bank is charged 
with overcommitting its resources to too many projects and thereby running 
the danger of lowering its standards; on the other hand, the Bank is accused of 
being too dictatorial, too insistent on its standards, too bureaucratic in its 
demands for the evidence of the economic viability of the purposes of its 
lending. I will deal with each charge in turn, for although I differ with the 
stated content of each position, each contains an aspect that points to the 
dilemma facing every international assistance agency. 
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Quantity versus quality has long been a false contest in the use of 
development aid. Obviously, any agency, whether bilateral or multilateral, 
strives to increase both the amount of resources it transfers and the 
effectiveness of these resources when transferred. But every agency can be 
charged with courting the danger of substituting quantity for quality, and, by 
implication, "better quality" transfers are seen as a substitute for lower aid 
allocations. I have said that the quality of development assistance must be 
measured in terms of the returns to project investments. The belief that quality 
and quantity are substitutable rests on the contention that opportunities for 
high returns on relatively small investments abound in underdeveloped 
nations. Pursue these opportunities, and the impact on world productivity will 
be as great, if not greater, than a larger quantity of resources transferred to 
relatively low-return endeavours. Although there can be no dispute with the 
mathematics of this argument, reality contradicts its premises. 
The indigenous entrepreneurs in developing nations are as aware as any 
international banker of the concept of return on investment. Through their 
own enterprise they have already driven returns from activities requiring 
relatively small investments to levels roughly equaling the cost of the money. 
Capital scarcity in the developing world is the unavailability of the large 
investment funds necessary to underwrite major enterprises that will unlock 
the high returns implicit in economic underdevelopment. If the high return 
payoff potential of Third World nations is to be attained, the need is for larger 
projects, not smaller or fewer. 
The examples abound. The hydroelectric potential of Nepal, perhaps the 
greatest in the world, can only be tapped by expenditures of multibillions of 
dollars. A $2-, or $4-, or even $10-million project in Nepal will have a small 
real return compared to a phased program to harness the waterpower of its 
great glacial-fed, mountainous rivers. The agricultural potential of the over 80 
million hectares of the southern Sudan is well documented. Development costs 
to exploit it will be in the tens of billions of dollars. The return for this 
expenditure could well be a doubling of present world food output. 
The major difficulty for those who work on development projects is 
attaining the means to assemble enough investment assistance to make a truly 
significant impact on world poverty. If there is validity to a concern that the 
World Bank or other aid agencies are involved in foo many projects, the 
concern should focus not on an overcommitment of resources but on the 
inability of these organizations to commit more to those activities that will 
provide a high yield. The total commitments of the World Bank in fiscal 
1975-76 (ending 30 June 1976) were just $6.9 billion, hardly a sum 
commensurate with its role as the world's foremost development banker, and 
certainly not in keeping with the immense investment opportunities and the 
needs of the Third World. 
The charge that identifying and preparing development projects is an 
exercise in excessive, and too often dictatorial bureaucracy, is not easily 
answered. The examples of tragic-comic project foolishness and waste are 
most frequently the result of inadequate planning and administrative attention 
by both donor and recipient. If assistance projects are confined to dams, or 
roads, or fertilizer plants, or turnkey industries, the burden or project work is 
relatively light. But to be frank, the record of long-term returns to such 
projects is not a bright one. The tropical world is studded with irrigation dams 
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that are unproductive because the project for their construction did not include 
building the channels necessary to bring water from the reservoirs to the farm 
fields; with factories that operate far below capacity because supplies of raw 
materials were not assured in the project design; with roads that crumble and 
break because the means of maintenance was not part of the project finance. 
The examples are many, and together they make a depressing litany of hope 
unfilled. 
The corrective is to prepare and implement comprehensive projects, 
usually of larger scale, that strive to include all of the elements necessary to 
ensure the realization of all available benefits. To build such projects, 
however, requires lengthy procedures and long periods of preparation time; 
and to implement them the assistance agency must insist that the recipient 
agree to and meet certain obligations as a condition of the partnership. 
If the large-scale, comprehensive project of the type now financed by a 
few donor agencies, including the World Bank, is to be faulted on the care it 
takes for preparation, I think the fault is not where the critics see it. It lies 
more in two other directions. First, a comprehensive project is usually shaped 
to be complete in itself, that is, it is seldom conceived as an element that should 
integrate in time and space with previous and succeeding project activities. 
Second, projects prepared as complete packages allow little room for either the 
chop and change, or the drastic alteration that may be dictated by emerging 
circumstances. 
What is Required? 
To tap the potentials for high economic returns from the large investment 
opportunities in the Third World will require the assembly of phased projects. 
each complete in itself and each an element or part of a larger system 
comprising an inclusive whole. Only through this approach to project planning 
can external assistance, however much it grows, have its full impact on world 
poverty. At present, few agencies engaged in international aid have the 
capacity to provide the leadership to undertake the large-scale planning tasks 
involved in this kind of development endeavour. The World Bank provided 
this service when it took the lead in the Indus Basin development program in 
India and Pakistan. The recent initiative by the DAC in the founding of the 
"Club des Amis du Sahel" to provide for comprehensive planning and 
development of the semi-arid sub-Saharan countries of Africa is an interesting 
innovation that bears close watching. The lessons learned from this DAC 
experience may open a new organizational basis for undertaking major 
development activities. Indeed, it seems likely that such activities can only be 
organized effectively by multilateral institutions possessing the flexibility to 
focus on the development of extensive geographic areas likely spanning several 
political boundaries. 
Building flexibility into projects prepared in holistic detail is not easy. Yet 
many projects fail to yield their promised benefits because they cannot respond 
readily to unforeseen circumstances or because they are built upon premises 
that later prove incorrect. Recasting imperfectly designed projects of a 
comprehensive nature during the course of their implementation is a costly 
task, yet not recasting them is often a sure prescription for failure. The 
quick-fix solutions most frequently applied in the urgency of field conditions 
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are seldom satisfactory in the long term. There is no easy way to prepare 
projects that are simultaneously more comprehensive in scope and detail, and 
more flexible in implementation. But if donor and recipient nations are to gain 
the full potential benefits from resources spent for development, a way must 
be found. 
An assessment of some recent projects suggests that it is possible to build 
projects in which the ultimate purposes are clearly specified, but in which 
many of the details of implementation are allowed to unfold as work proceeds. 
Such projects are analogous to the development of a long-term national 
economic plan that is recast from year to year in accordance with experience 
and the play of external variables. Such a method of project development 
requires more preparation work and a larger field staff during implementa-
tion. Project personnel should be experimental and utilize the experience and 
understanding they gain during execution. Such projects demand continuous 
monitoring and an ongoing evaluation and feedback. Above all, the project 
staff must receive strong, patient moral support from both donor and 
recipient. Their financing could probably be handled best as a line of 
credit to be drawn as the project evolves. 
As I review what I have said, I find I have touched on only a few of the 
present problems. I have said nothing about the continuing disequilibrating 
effects of rapid population growth, or about the problems of energy, or of 
environmental protection, or of the choices of developmental lifestyles, or of 
technology transfer, or of social and political structures and their reform, or of 
relations with multinational corporations - the list is long, and my talent 
inadequate to the task. What I have mentioned are a few of the central issues 
surrounding the goal of reduced world poverty. 
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Future Prospects 
I do not believe the richer nations will continue to djther and meet with half measures the 
present plight of the poorer countries. This belief 
rests most heavily on the charitable instincts of the 
ordinary citizens of the rich nations. But it receives 
support also from the knowledge that self-interest 
dictates steps to prevent a significant Third World 
default to the institutions of international credit, 
and greater efforts to balance the trading deficits 
of the poor countries to stimulate world trade. 
Although my outlook is optimistic, I do not 
trunk that overcoming the huge international 
deficits of Third World nations will be easy. 
However, there is already evidence in the 
advanced countries of a willingness to consider 
more carefully the cries of the poor for a better international economic deal. 
Commodity price stabilization through financial and stock buffers seems a 
likely development within the next few years. Relief of debt and the more 
onerous burdens of debt servicing for low-income nations is probably close at 
hand. Although 1 do not see international assistance budgets rising 
spectacularly in the near future, I think there will be a slow but perceptible 
increase in concessionary funds and a move from loan aid toward more grant 
assistance. (The latter will be especially important if donor nations are to 
prevent a repeat buildup of official debt in the Third World.) Likewise, access 
to technology will be made easier for the developing economies; and codes of 
conduct, enforceable in the home country, will come to govern the presently 
unregulated activities of the transnational corporations in their dealings with 
both developed and developing states. Private cartels , international price 
discrimination, and market area allocation to subsidiary plants of single large 
corporations will likely be outlawed. In short, in the next decade there will be 
an increasing number of actions taken by the rich to formalize the rules 
governing the operating interdependence of their economies with each other 
and with the Third World nations. In the long run, advanced countries are 
likely to consider more carefully than they do now the impact of domestic 
protectionist policies on Third World economic progress. The richer nations 
may even go so far as to undertake in the name of foreign assistance major 
intramural allocations to ease the impact on domestic workers of concessions 
granted to Third World trading partners. 
These several measures and concessions will only partially meet the needs 
of the poorer states. If they are major and vigorously implemented, they will 
add to the effective transfer of real resources and may reduce the necessity for 
a rapid expansion of direct financial assistance. Although such a result 
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would be wished, it is unlikely that transfers through the several routes opened 
by the "trade-not-aid" slogan will be adequate to the task of developing the 
underdeveloped. If poverty is to be reduced measurably within the next half 
century, the burden of its elimination rests heaviest upon the quantity and use 
of direct transfers of real resources through programs of international 
assistance and cooperation. 
Much of this assistance will be channeled to the support of developmental 
projects, the source of structural change and economic progress. Agriculture 
and rural development will receive greater emphasis in the mix of future 
project activities as both rich and poor strive to assure the world's growing 
population secure food supplies, and provide the recipient nations with a 
growing demand for the products of their fledgling industrial-urban sectors. 
As projects, whether to aid primary, secondary, or service industries, 
come to be seen as the cutting edge for long-term economic growth, more care 
will be taken in their preparation and implementation. Efforts will be made to 
secure a better coordination of project activities among donor agencies; 
greater attention will be paid to the return received for the expenditures of 
resources and for the distribution of these returns among the social and 
economic classes of the recipient nations. The patterns of donor action that 
were embraced in the Mekong and Indus River development programs and in 
the present programs in the Sahel will become more common as the world 
community of nations accepts the challenges offered by the large investment 
opportunities necessary to develop the underdeveloped areas of the globe. 
I will close with one example. World food production today sits on the 
knife-edge of instability. North American farming can meet reasonable food 
deficits in the short-term future, but a repeat of the droughts of 1972, or even 
the Asian crop failures of 1965-67, would severely strain global food supplies. 
In the long run, not even North America will be able to keep abreast of food 
demand swelled by population growth and the capability of rising worldwide 
affluence will give to consumers to fulfill their desire for better diets. The 
tropical belt of the world holds the potential to produce a vast abundance of 
food. To unlock this potential will require developmental projects and sums of 
money that dwarf any previous experience with international aid. 
Let me touch on this potential. The plains of northern India, and of Nepal 
and Bangladesh comprise over 55 million hectares, all of which could be fully 
irrigated. With present multiple cropping technologies, annual yields of 15 
tons of food grain per hectare would be commonplace - an aggregate output 
level that would increase present world grain production by 70 percent. As un-
likely a region as the Sahel has the potential water and soil resources to yield 
food-grain quantities equal to what is now grown in Canada. The 80 million 
hectares of the southern Sudan likely have food potential that could more than 
double present global outturn. In fact, examples of a high food potential can 
be drawn from almost any area of the tropical world. 
The potential is large; so are the costs of realizing it. As a conservative 
estimate, a farm modernization program on the north Indian plains would 
require between $30 and $50 billion. If we place the costs against the GNP of 
the three countries involved, for example, India at about $80 billion, 
Bangladesh at $8 billion, and Nepal at $1 billion, $90 billion in all, it is easy to 
understand why the leaders of the three subcontinent nations view the northern 
river plains development as a future dream. It would be a courageous act, 
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probably labeled as foolhardy in the sober financial circles of the world, for 
subcontinent statesmen to announce the launching of an investment plan 
greater in magnitude than one-half of the present total gross national product. 
Dream or not, the potential is there. It is only a question of how long the 
world can afford to let it lie unrealized for want of little more than one-tenth 
of the resources spent annually on armies and armaments. At some point, 
reason must prevail; the agriculture of the Indian subcontinent and of all the 
tropical world must be transformed by the coordinated efforts of all nations. 
The survival of those born and yet unborn will demand it within the next 20 
years. I am greatly optimistic that the demand and the potential will be 
combined in a way that meets the one by realizing the other. 
I believe the joint actions of rich and poor can and will be focused on 
harmonizing economic possibilities with need. To do this successfully will 
demand of the donor more resources, and a greater and wiser assertiveness in 
how they are used; it will require from the recipient a willingness to pursue 
high growth in an environment of social and political equity. Both donor and 
recipient must learn to bear the judgments of performance each will make of 
the other, and to respond sympathetically to such judgments. The bond 
between the economically advanced countries and those of the Third W arid 
can be built and solidified only by a symmetry of concern for humanity, of 
shared obligations, and of effective performance. When global consultations 
and actions reflect a reciprocity of responsibilities incumbent on the wealthy 
and on the poor alike, man can be confident that the vast opportunities held by 
his planet will finally be opened for his sustenance. 
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Conclusions 
The Oriental curse "may you live in interesting times" has been placed upon us all. But the curse carries opportunity. World gross product 
is estimated at about $5 .6 trillion, over 80 percent of it generated in the nations 
with large per capita incomes. Persisting world poverty is neither for want of 
global economic and technical power to engineer development, nor for want of 
potential and need; it is only for want of determined political will and action. 
The world this generation passes to the next can be one where the cries of the 
poor will continue unheeded, or it can be one where the unity of mankind is 
expressed through political agreement to launch a grand assault on the 
afflictions of the poor. The crossroads can be ignored only at the peril of all; a 
new route, a new consultation, a new sympathy, a new will, and a new action 
can secure the well-being of all mankind. 
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